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Union Leadership and Member Attitudes: A Multi-Level 
Analysis 
Tove Helland Hammer, Mahmut Bayazit, David. L. Wazeter1 
Analyses of union leadership roles show that union presidents should have both a within-
union focus and an external focus. The authors combined multi-level survey data from 3,871 
union members in 248 local teachers’ unions with archival and field staff data to examine 
relationships between leadership and members’ perceptions of union instrumentality and justice, 
union commitment, and participation. The results showed significant union-level effects on 
members’ beliefs about, and attitudes toward, their unions, attributable to the presidents’ 
internal and external leadership, wage outcomes, and union characteristics. Relationships 
between internally focused leadership and members’ loyalty and willingness to work for the 
union were partially mediated by perceptions of union instrumentality and justice. These 
perceptions fully mediated the relationship between externally focused leadership and union 
loyalty. 
Meta-analyses and other summaries of studies on union members’ commitment to, and 
participation in, their locals show that union instrumentality, pro-union attitudes, job 
satisfaction, and organizational commitment combine, either directly or indirectly, to cause 
union commitment (e.g., Bamberger, Kluger, & Suchard, 1999; Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 
1992), which, in turn, contributes to union participation (see Fullagar, Gallagher, Clark, & Carroll, 
2004). 
The immediate antecedents of union commitment and participation are thus either 
attitudes toward, or perceptions of, the union and the employer. Both are institutions, not 
actors. It is assumed, of course, that there are actors both inside and outside the union and the 
employer who create the conditions that lead to union commitment and participation, but 
there has been very little research done on what the actors do and how their actions shape 
union involvement. In this study, we examine the relationships between union leadership, in 
the form of local union presidents, and the antecedents of union commitment and participation. 
We focus on those attitudes and perceptions that lead to union involvement, in particular, on 
union members’ beliefs about union instrumentality and justice, because it will allow us to test 
some of the assumptions behind the hypotheses that link leadership and member involvement. 
We believe that the effects of leadership are more likely to be felt, and therefore observed, on 
the perceptions and beliefs that lead to member commitment and participation, because it is 
the role, or duty, of union leaders to secure the conditions on which members’ perceptions and 
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beliefs are based. There is closer proximity between what a union leader does and the 
consequences of union membership for the rank-and- file than there is between leadership and 
members’ commitment and participation. As part of this study, we also test hypotheses about 
the mediating effects of instrumentality beliefs and justice perceptions on the relationships 
between leader behaviors and member commitment and participation. 
We consider union leadership to be a group-, or organization-, level variable, in the 
sense that the union leader is a part of the social context to which people belong, or in which 
they work, and as such is a shared experience for rank-and-file union members. The union 
leader can be viewed as a property, or characteristic, of the union. If there are leadership 
effects on union commitment and participation, we expect that part of the variance in the 
members’ beliefs and attitudes can be attributed to the union to which they belong. We 
therefore have in this study a large sample of local unions, each with a separate leader, the 
union president, to allow us to model effects on both the individual and the union level. 
There is another important reason for testing hypotheses about leadership effects with 
a multiple-union research design. A union leader’s ability to serve the interests of rank-and-file 
members depends in part on external factors, such as the economy or the employer. To isolate 
the effects of leadership on those dimensions of union effectiveness that involve the followers, 
one must control for organizational and environmental characteristics that influence members’ 
perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. These are in part union specific, but they should include 
union density, labor market conditions, and employer munificence (Hammer & Avgar, 2005). 
One could argue that environmental factors are exogenous to the relationship between the 
union and its members and that their influence is therefore already captured by the union’s 
ability to protect its members from the vagaries of labor markets and employers’ financial 
health. However, it is just as likely that these factors do not operate solely through union 
instrumentality but have a direct influence on commitment levels and participation. Their 
effects are an empirical question. This means, in turn, that we need research samples of 
multiple unions or union locals that vary in external characteristics, both to be able to isolate 
the union-level variance in members’ attitudes and behaviors that can be attributed to the 
union’s leadership as well as to ensure that leadership effects are not biased upward. 
There is theoretically and empirically coherent research in industrial relations and labor 
economics on how unions, or union membership, influence employee attitudes toward the job 
and the employer (e.g., Bryson, Cappellari, & Lucifora, 2004; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Lincoln 
& Booth, 1993). In contrast, the few studies that have included leadership in models of union 
commitment and participation are an idiosyncratic collection of theoretical approaches, case 
studies, and scattered findings about shop stewards, not union presidents. The shop steward is 
the union official with whom rank-and-file members are likely to have most daily contact, but 
the steward’s role, although quite broad in theory (Nash, 1983), is limited to servicing members, 
primarily by handling grievances, solving personal disputes between individual members and 
the employer, and acting as an information conduit between union officers and the 
membership (e.g., Catlett & Brown, 1990; Chang, 2005). It is the president of the local union 
who is responsible for ensuring that the union reaches its organizational goals. Because the 
president is responsible for all aspects of union effectiveness, in both the internal life of the 
union and in the union’s relationships with important external actors, he or she is more likely to 
determine the conditions that encourage members’ attachment to, and appreciation of, their 
union, such as the nature and strength of the union contract, the quality of labor–management 
relations, or the union’s success as a protector of workplace rights.2 
The importance of the presidents’ role was illustrated in the early studies of the 
transition in U.S. industrial relations from a rule-based “job-control unionism” system with 
industry-wide pattern bargaining toward a model that includes formal and informal structures 
of worker participation, decentralized bargaining with local union autonomy, and flexible firm-
or plant-specific job classifications (Kochan, Katz, & McKersie, 1986). More recent studies of 
local unions demonstrate how union officers, primarily presidents, represent the memberships’ 
interests through their engagement in workplace governance and firm strategy (Eaton, 
Rubinstein, & Kochan, 2008; Rubinstein, 2001). Research on teachers’ unions, conducted in the 
wake of the education reform movement that started in the mid-1980s, also shows how local 
union presidents negotiated collaborative partnerships with school boards and superintendents 
and worked to expand school-based decision making for teachers (Kerchner & Koppick, 1993; 
Kerchner & Mitchell, 1988; Urbanski, 1990). 
Our study is important for three reasons. First, there is hardly any empirical research 
available on top-level leadership in local unions.3 Yet, it is well known that employment 
relations in the unionized workplace depend on the quality of both management and union 
leadership (e.g., Frost, 2000; Katz & Darbishire, 2000; Kochan et al., 1986). Second, we examine 
how union leaders can contribute to the conditions that result in member commitment and 
participation. We do so to allow a more differentiated picture of the processes through which 
union leaders influence member reactions than the picture made possible in prior studies. Third, 
this is, to our knowledge, the first study of union effects on member attitudes that controls for 
organizational characteristics based on a large sample of unions. 
Modeling Union Leadership 
Because studies of local union leadership have focused almost exclusively on shop 
stewards, we review these briefly. Early case studies described the stewards’ roles and power 
inside the union hierarchy and on the shop floor (e.g., Batstone, Boraston, & Frenkel, 1977; 
Marchington & Armstrong, 1983; Sayles & Strauss, 1967). Research on the psychological 
processes through which stewards might influence rank-and-file union members’ attitudes and 
behaviors followed two different paths. One set of studies tested hypotheses about the effects 
of stewards’ transformational leadership characteristics on member commitment and 
participation (Fullagar, Clark, Gallagher, & Gordon, 1994; Fullagar, McCoy, & Shull, 1992; 
Kelloway & Barling, 1993). The second set examined the stewards’ service orientation, defined 
as being accessible and available to the members, listening to their concerns, keeping them 
informed about union activity, and encouraging expression of opinions (Metochi, 2002; 
Nicholson, Ursell, & Blyton, 1980; Thacker, Fields, & Barklay, 1990). 
2
 Other union officers, such as a secretary–treasurer, vice-president, or committee chairs, may share the president’s leadership responsibilities. 
In some local unions, particularly in the construction and building trades, a business agent is the central union officer responsible for contract 
negotiations and the union’s relationship with the employer. 
3 
An exception is an in-depth case study of union governance in the International Typographical Union (Lipset, Trow, & Coleman, 1956), 
which, although focused on national-level leaders, included analyses of leadership in union locals. 
In addition, Skarlicki and Latham (1996, 1997) examined the effects of training shop 
stewards to use principles of procedural and interactional justice on the basis of the assumption 
that union members would be more willing to participate in the union when they saw the 
leaders as sincere and fair. 
The Role of the Union President 
The question then becomes: What can union leaders do to influence members’ beliefs 
about instrumentality and justice, as well as their attitudes toward the union? We sought the 
answer not in traditional leadership theories but in an analysis of the union president’s role in 
building and maintaining effective local unions. 
The traditional role of a local union president includes preparing for negotiations, actual 
bargaining, policing the union contract, and ensuring that the grievance process works. In 
addition, the role involves managing the internal life of the union, which includes tasks shared 
with, or delegated to, shop stewards, such as building up the local by keeping members 
informed about the local’s present activities and future plans on all fronts; encouraging 
members to attend meetings and vote in union elections; soliciting information from members 
about their concerns; resolving internal conflicts and building consensus; recruiting new 
members; and training, coaching, and educating members for union roles. In short, the local 
union president works to make the union an active and beneficial presence in each member’s 
mind. 
Servicing the membership has been, and continues to be, the dominant model of local 
union leadership in the U.S. The servicing model is anchored in the union’s role as protector of 
people’s workplace interests and rights. It was long assumed that the more effective unions 
were at solving members’ problems for them, the stronger the union would be as an institution 
(Grabelsky & Hurd, 1994). However, an unanticipated consequence of having unionleaders and 
staff focus on service was complacent union members who did not participate actively in the 
union’s struggle to ensure their rights. New strategies developed at the national union level to 
revitalize local unions and recruit new members with an organizing model, however, have not 
diminished the importance of service to the rank-and-file (for descriptions and research on the 
organizing model, see Bronfenbrenner, Friedman, Hurd, Oswald , & Seeber, 1998; Fletcher & 
Hurd, 1998; Hurd, 1998; for evaluations of the organizing model, see Hurd, 2004).4 This does 
4
 Declines in union density throughout the 1970s and 1980s led the AFL-CIO to develop new strategies at both the national and local level to 
increase membership. The organizing model was supposed to increase union growth in two ways, by allocating resources to recruitment 
(external organizing) and by energizing and activating existing union members at the local level to enable them to solve their own workplace 
problems (internal organizing). It was assumed that empowering the rank-and-file would rekindle the grassroots activism and commitment that 
characterized the union movement’s earlier days, which, in turn, would make unions more visible and attractive to the unorganized, and also 
free up union staff and leadership to focus on external organizing. A variant on the internal organizing model is the Mutual Aid Logic, in which 
members are trained to help one another with personal and substance abuse problems (Bacharach, Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl, 2001). The 
organizing model requires that union officers create structures and procedures, and train and supervise union staff, for recruitment, as well as 
train rank-and-file members to service themselves and fellow members. Evaluations of the organizing model have shown modest gains in 
overall membership growth and, at best, temporary increases in local union activism. By and large, union members have been unwilling to 
trade being serviced for the personal demands of empowerment, and union staff and leaders have been overwhelmed by new tasks, skills, and 
time demands. Efforts at internal organizing have been largely abandoned, although the external organizing model is operative at the local level 
in several national unions. There are still efforts to rekindle local union militancy by following the Bronfenbrenner model of using the time 
during contract negotiations to mobilize the rank-and-file, but this is rare in teachers’ unions (R. W. Hurd, personal communication, April 4, 
2008). 
not mean that local union leaders can safely ignore efforts to involve the members in the 
union’s business on a daily basis or to mobilize them around special tasks or events, such as 
contract negotiations and job actions. The union’s ability to enhance and protect member 
interests depends also on the solidarity of an actively engaged membership, which is why it is 
important for unions to find ways to increase member commitment and participation. 
We identify three different, but interrelated, components of the president’s within-
union focused leadership. These are (a) keeping members informed and educated about the 
union, the contract, and their workplace rights; (b) enforcing the contract and resolving 
conflicts and problems for the individual member; and (c) consulting with and including 
members in the administration of the local. 
Informing and educating members involves giving members information about the local 
as an institution, about its present policies and future plans, and about its relationship with the 
state and national (or international) union; it involves counseling members about their rights 
under the union contract and how the union works to assist its members; and it involves 
teaching them about the duties and obligations of union membership. Contract enforcement 
and conflict resolution includes monitoring the employer’s adherence to the contract terms 
throughout and beyond the hours of work, helping members file grievances and attending 
grievance hearings, and solving conflicts between individual members and the employer, or 
among members. Consulting and including members means involving the members in decision 
making, delegating union tasks to the members, and soliciting opinions about contract 
proposals and other important matters. 
Although these are conceptually different sets of behaviors, they are interrelated in the 
sense that they are likely to occur together in interactions between president and members. 
They should therefore have the same effect on, or relationship with, members’ beliefs about 
union instrumentality and justice. It is also possible that members will not compartmentalize 
their perceptions of the president but instead see him or her as more or less actively engaged 
working for them and for the local as an institution. This is especially true when there is physical 
distance between the union president who resides in the union office and rank-and-file 
members who are located in different workplaces. 
The management of external relations, which involves a variety of administrative and 
coalition building activities aimed at increasing the union’s chances to improve wages, benefits, 
and working conditions for its members, is also an important part of the president’s role (Katz & 
Darbishire, 2000; Kochan et al., 1986). Externally focused activities include preparing for 
negotiations by gathering economic and contract data from inside and outside the local, 
developing negotiating teams and plans for impasse and job actions, building external political 
networks for future support, collaborating with the employer on integrative issues, working 
with the state- and national-level union staff, and making long-range plans about membership 
drives, bargaining goals, or the union’s response to future problems. Again, these activities can 
be grouped into conceptually distinct categories, such as preparing for negotiations or working 
with external union staff on long-range planning for the local, but the common denominator is 
the external focus aimed at making the local more effective in reaching its goals. It is therefore 
not obvious that they would have different effects on members’ beliefs about the utility of the 
union. One could, perhaps, argue that one set of activities would have a stronger effect on 
union effectiveness than would another set, but we have no prior basis for such a hypothesis. 
The externally focused behaviors work together to produce results, and their possible 
differential effects on local union strength is an empirical question. 
A number of these functions, such as preparing for negotiations, actual bargaining, or 
external coalition building, cannot be observed easily by rank-and-file union members because 
the activities may occur infrequently and, when they do, are likely to happen outside the 
members’ direct experience with the president. If union presidents are effective managers of 
external relations, however, members should experience the results in the form of bargaining 
outcomes and in the nature of the labor–management relationship. 
To assess both the internal and external leadership of the union presidents, we need 
information from different observers who can capture the leaders’ activities in the different 
domains. Those familiar with how the union president carries out his or her responsibilities 
away from the membership may also know how well the president functions within the local, in 
part because they may observe the results of the internally focused leadership, but it is the 
rank-and-file union members who are the immediate observers of how the president acts vis-a-
vis them. We therefore examine local union leadership from two vantage points: the union 
members’ perceptions from within the union and the assessment of the more externally 
focused leadership from the state and national union’s field staff. The outcome variables in this 
study are the members’ beliefs and attitudes, however, so the hypotheses concern those only. 
Hypotheses 
Most models of union commitment and participation include union instrumentality, by 
which is usually meant the union’s ability to deliver on wages, benefits, and other conditions of 
employment, and pro-union attitudes, usually defined as positive beliefs about unions as 
institutions. Scholars disagree about their relative importance, however. Some argue for the 
primacy of the union’s instrumental role over its ideological role, especially in the U.S. (e.g., 
Kochan et al., 1986); others consider both as predictors that can follow different paths (e.g., 
Bamberger et al., 1999; Barling et al., 1992). Missing in the debate about the relative 
importance of ideology and values is the recognition that unions differ with respect to history, 
ties to political parties, goals, the occupational identity of their members, national cultural 
values, and legal systems. Some unions have a strong ideological commitment to trade 
unionism as a political or social movement; others have less.5 
We suggest that the utility of union membership goes beyond economic gains and 
employment rights to include the provision of justice, both in the form of an equitable labor 
exchange (distributive justice) and the members’ ability to have a voice in important union 
decisions (procedural justice). Because wages are determined jointly by the union and the 
employer, union leaders will have less control over distributive justice (in this case, wage equity) 
than they will have over the delivery of procedural justice. Despite the employer’s ability to 
constrain wage settlements, however, the union’s role in negotiating a fair wage can be 
substantial, so at least part of the credit for members’ experience of distributive justice belongs 
5 The union locals included in this study are members of the National Education Association and are characterized by a commitment to 
achieving strong wages, hours, and working conditions, and professional advocacy. While many of the members do not see themselves as trade 
unionists per se, their overall levels of commitment to their association are high, and they do bargain to achieve and protect contract gains. 
to the union. The empirical link between proceduraland distributive justice is well established 
(see Greenberg, 1996, for summaries), supporting the theoretical argument that perceptions of 
fair procedures lead to perceptions of fair outcomes (Leventhal, 1976; Thibault & Walker, 1975). 
Given the centrality of the union contract to union members, we argue that it matters how 
union presidents determine the union’s contract proposals. We therefore examine the 
relationships between how union presidents fulfill their leadership obligations and members’ 
perceptions of union instrumentality for both wages and non-wage outcomes, wage equity, and 
procedural justice, as well as the more global constructs of union commitment and 
participation. We model the relationships between the union president’s leadership and the 
members’ perceptions of, and attitudes toward, their union with the following outcome 
variables: union instrumentality for wages and non-wage outcomes (to capture the non-
economic conditions of employment), wage equity (distributive justice), fairness of procedures 
used to determine wage scales (procedural justice), union commitment, and union participation. 
Members’ beliefs about union instrumentality, fair treatment by the union, and wage 
equity are based on combinations of the union’s ability to deliver at the bargaining table, the 
leaders’ ability to ensure that the employer adheres to contract provisions, the help or service 
they receive from union officials, their own engagement in the union, as well as what they are 
told about the union’s role in negotiating and policing the contract. Both internally and 
externally focused leadership should be related to instrumentality perceptions because the 
purpose of both is to increase the utility of the local to the members. The relationship is 
obvious with respect to externally focused leadership. We suggest that internally focused 
leadership will also contribute to instrumentality perceptions, however, because the day-to-day 
functions of local union leadership consist of helping members solve workplace conflicts and 
problems. We therefore expect that presidents with a problem solving or service orientation 
will strengthen the members’ beliefs about the utility of the union. 
Understanding the relationships between the union president’s behavior and members’ 
perceptions of fair treatment requires an analysis of why justice is important and how it affects 
attitudes and behaviors. Justice has instrumental value, in the sense that fair processes are 
more likely to result in outcomes we prefer (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibault & Walker, 1975). Being 
treated fairly also tells us that we are respected, valued, and included members of a group or 
an organization (Lind, 2001; Tyler & Blader, 2000). Finally, for many, obtaining and providing 
justice is a moral principle (Deutsch, 1975; Folger, 1998). Cognitive and affective responses to 
fair treatment include gratitude toward, and trust in, the justice provider, a sense of group 
pride and belongingness, and an obligation to reciprocate (Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & 
Schminke, 2001). According to social exchange theory (e.g., Blau, 1986; Organ, 1990) and the 
group-value model of justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988), positive affect, the desire to remain in close 
interpersonal relationships, and the motivation to work for the benefit of the group or 
collectivity link justice perceptions to outcomes like organizational citizenship behavior (e.g., 
Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Organ, 1990) and 
organizational commitment (Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991; Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & 
Taylor, 2000). The effects are stronger for procedural justice than for distributive 
justicebecause perceptions of distributive justice stem from an outcome’s instrumental value 
whereas procedural justice has both instrumental and relational roots (Cropanzano et al., 2001). 
It is also possible that the effect of distributive justice is even weaker for union outcomes since 
members may not attribute the responsibility for fair outcomes solely to union leadership. 
The large amount of data testifying to organizational consequences of justice comes 
from studies of employment relationships, but the psychological processes that explain the 
findings will operate in unions as well (e.g., Aryee & Chay, 2001; Fuller & Hester, 2001; Johnson 
& Jarley, 2004). The relationship between the union and its members has been described as a 
psychological contract that prescribes the exchange of members’ commitment and 
participation for bargaining outcomes and social inclusion (Gordon & Fryxell, 1993; Shore, 
Tetrick, Sinclair, & Newton, 1994; Tetrick, 1995). In the context of our study, a relationship of 
union involvement with wage equity would result from an economic exchange, and a 
relationship with the process used to determine union wage goals would stem from both an 
economic and a social exchange. 
Internally focused leadership should be related to members’ perceptions of procedural 
justice because it includes being given a voice in determining the union’s bargaining goals either 
through simple exchanges of information with the president about contract negotiations or by 
being formally or informally included in union decision making. Externally focused leadership 
should contribute to members’ beliefs about distributive justice (wage equity) because wages 
depend on what the union obtains in bargaining. 
We test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The time and effort union presidents expend on internally focused 
union activities will be positively related to members’ perceptions of 
(a) wage and non-wage outcomes instrumentality and 
(b) procedural justice. 
Hypothesis 2: The time and effort union presidents expend on externally focused 
union activities will be positively related to members’ perceptions of 
(a) wage and non-wage outcomes instrumentality and 
(b) wage equity (distributive justice). 
Prior studies have tested hypotheses about the causal paths between leadership and 
union commitment and participation. We are not proposing a new model of the union leader– 
member involvement relationship, but we expect this relationship to be 
mediated by members’ perceptions of instrumentality and justice .The relationships between 
what union leaders do and the behavioral components of union commitment (willingness to 
work for, and responsibility to, the union) and participation in the union are not straightforward. 
The relationships could be negative if the union leaders are effective as external managers 
because with a favorable contract and cordial labor–management relations, members may feel 
no pressing need to get involved to fix what is not broken. On the other hand, internally 
focused leadership might succeed in pulling the members into active duty even if their 
conditions of employment are satisfactory. The social exchange and group-value theories 
suggest that the members’ motivation to reciprocate fair treatment from union leaders would 
lead to union involvement. 
Because internally focused leadership includes both the president’s efforts to serve 
members and his or her efforts to educate and involve them, we expect this focus to be related 
to both the affective and behavioral components of union commitment and participation, 
partly conditional on the relationship between the president’s behavior and members’ 
perceptions of instrumentality and procedural justice. Externally focused leadership, on the 
other hand, is not aimed at turning rank-and-file members into active trade unionists, so we 
expect it to be important primarily for union loyalty through the members’ recognition and 
appreciation of the union’s role in securing valued outcomes. 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between union presidents’ internally focused 
leadership and members’ union commitment will be partially mediated by 
members’ perceptions of union instrumentality and procedural justice. 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between union presidents’ externally focused 
leadership and members’ loyalty to the union will be mediated by members’ 
perceptions of union instrumentality and distributive justice. 
There are a number of contextual variables that are likely to contribute to union 
members’ beliefs about instrumentality and justice, commitment and participation, the most 
obvious being bargaining outcomes. We therefore control for employer munificence and wages 
when testing the hypotheses. Because local union size and the quality of union–management 
relations have been found to be related to union commitment in earlier studies, we include 
measures of both in the equations, as well as standard demographic variables. 
Method 
Samples and Procedures 
The data used in this study come from a large project on local union effectiveness that 
included union leadership, union commitment, and wage bargaining. Subjects were 326 
presidents and 4,363 public school teachers in grades K–12 from union locals (local 
associations), and 51 state-level staff members of the National Education Association. The 
union locals comprised 65% of the 501 school districts in a northeastern state that has a 
compulsory bargaining law. The primary data came from surveys that were supplemented with 
financial, demographic, and salary information from the state education association’s archives. 
The state association randomly selected members from each of the locals for inclusion in the 
study, with the number of subjects determined by the size of the local. 
The surveys were sent to 14,388 union members from the state association’s headquarters 
because the association did not want to release members’ names and addresses. Of these, 
4,668 were returned for a response rate of 30%. Code numbers were used to identify 
respondents by union local and to match survey responses to the demographic and salary data. 
Each survey was accompanied by two letters, one from the president of the state association 
endorsing the study and one from the researchers describing the purpose of the study and the 
procedures used to ensure confidentiality of responses, as well as a postage paid envelope to 
return completed surveys to the researchers at their university. A comparison of the school 
districts and teachers in the sample with districts and teachers in the state showed that at the 
district- (or union-local-) level of analysis, the state and sample means on organizational, 
demographic, and economic variables were similar.6 
Measures 
The data used in the hypothesis tests came from three sources: union members, union 
staff, and union archives.7 We describe the union leadership variables first, followed by 
outcome and control variables. Most of the measures, except the leadership scales, were 
previously designed and validated scales. 
Explanatory Variables 
Union leadership. Information about union presidents’ behavior was collected from the 
union members and union field staff. 
Internal leadership. The measures of internal (within-union focused) leadership were 
provided by the union members who described, on a 5-point verbally anchored scale, how 
often their union president engaged in each of 12 activities directed at solving problems for, 
consulting with, and informing union members (from almost never to almost all the time). Scale 
content was based on interviews with state association staff and local association presidents, 
and it included items from Nicholson et al.’s (1980) measure of service orientation. Because we 
theorized that union leadership was an organizational-level multi-dimensional construct, we 
conducted a multi-level confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to examine the structure of the scale 
at both the individual and local union level. We followed the recommended method of Dyer, 
Hanges, and Hall (2005) and first examined intraclass correlations (ICCs) at the item level. All 
ICCs were between 10 and 17, which suggested that there was considerable variation at the 
local union level, justifying aggregation. We then tested the measurement model with three 
first-order factors and a second-order leadership factor at both levels. All items (see the 
Appendix for the items) loaded significantly on their respective factors, and the first-order 
factors loaded significantly in the second-order factor at both levels. The model fit the data 
well, ҳ2(102, NLevel 1 = 2,334; NLevel 2 =293) = 651.7 (comparative fit index [CFI] =.97, Tucker–Lewis 
index [TLI] = .97, root-mean-square error of approximation [RMSEA]= .048, squared root-mean 
residual [SRMR]between = .045, SRMRwithin = .022). The ICC1 value for the leadership scale was .13, 
and the ICC2 value was .70. 
We calculated the rwg(j) for the scale (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984) for all local 
unions in the sample. The median rwg(j) was .95. An examination of rwg(j) for each local union 
showed that out of 295 locals, 244 had rwg(j) scores above .90. There were only 15 local unions 
with rwg(j)s that were below the .70 mark that has been suggested as a heuristic. Of these, 8 
were between .00 and .70, and 7 were outside of the range of rwg(j)s (either negative or above 
1). A number of the 15 local unions with no agreement were not part of the sample used in the 
analysis because we did not have matching data on union characteristics. Dropping the small 
number of other unions with no agreement did not change the results. Therefore, all items 
6 District size (enrollment figures) were 2,844 for the state and 2,661 for the sample; a school district wealth indicator was 49 for the state and 
50 for the sample; teacher experience was 16.4 years for the state and 16.5 years for the sample; and teacher post-secondary education 
attainment was 5.7 years for the state and 5.7 years for the sample. 
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 Union presidents provided information about the time requirements of different leadership functions that were not used in the present study. 
were combined in one scale (a= .95), and the scale score was aggregated to the local union 
level with union ID numbers. 
External leadership. Data on externally focused leadership came from the state 
association field staff who described the extent to which the presidents of the locals in the 
geographical part of the state they supervised engaged in six activities. Subjects rated their 
responses on a 5-point, verbally anchored, agree- disagree scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Each item was a statement beginning with the phrase “The local 
president.” The items were the following: (a) “builds external political support for teachers and 
education by creating alliances with community organizations, working to elect pro-education 
candidates for political office, and/or generating political action contributions from members”; 
(b) “prepares for negotiations externally by monitoring negotiations in the region and state and 
by participating in coordinated bargaining”; (c) “administers the local union by maintaining 
accurate records, preparing administrative reports on t ime, allocating sufficient time to 
accomplish high priority tasks, responding to requests of individual members, and monitoring 
school board meetings”; (d) “makes long-range, strategic plans for the local association with 
respect to such issues as membership goals, future bargaining goals, how to respond to future 
fiscal or political problems, a discontented citizenry, education reform”; (e) “works to involve 
the local union in initiatives to improve the quality of education in the school district”; and (f) 
“communicates clearly and adequately with the state association representative.” All items 
loaded on one factor and were combined in one scale (a=.89). No aggregation was necessary 
since each president was rated by only one member of the field staff.8 
All the other variables used in the study were measured with 5-point, verbally anchored 
scales, unless otherwise indicated. The scales had items in statement form to which subjects 
were asked to agree or disagree. Response alternatives ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). 
Outcome Variables 
Union commitment. Nineteen items from the 30-item Commitment scale developed by 
Gordon, Philpot, Burt, Thompson, and Spiller (1980) were used to measure union loyalty, 
willingness to work for the union, and responsibility to the union. We included the strongest 
items (those with the highest factor loadings) from the original scales and excluded items that 
did not fit well with a teacher’s union. Bayazit, Hammer, and Wazeter (2004) showed that the 
negatively worded items created a method artifact, and the authors suggested that this method 
variance should be dealt with before testing theoretical relationships. We therefore used factor 
scores that were estimated by using a three-factor CFA with a fourth orthogonal methods 
factor. The measure contained nine loyalty items (a=.92), four willingness items (a=.82), and 
four responsibility items (a=.72). 
Participation in the union. Participation in the union was measured with a scale 
developed by McShane (1986), which contains five questions that asked if the respondent had, 
in the last 2 years, run for elected office or held a local union position, served on a local 
8 ICC1 for the external leadership measure indicating interdependence between ratings of different local presidents by the same staff member 
was .18. To control for this interdependence, we ran a three-level analysis where the staff members as raters of multiple local presidents’ 
external focus were at the third level. The results of these analyses did not change the results from the hypothesis tests. We therefore report 
results of HLM analyses using two levels for reasons of parsimony. The results of the three-level analyses are available from Tove Helland 
Hammer on request. 
committee, gone to a union meeting, represented the local at a state or regional meeting or a 
convention, and/or filed a grievance through the local. We added a sixth item, asking whether 
the respondent had participated in a coffee klatch (a community relations activity unique to 
teachers’ unions) or other community related work for the local. Respondents answered yes or 
no to each question, and responses were summed to make a union involvement or 
participation index. Participation is not a conventional latent variable but rather a composite 
variable (MacCallum & Browne, 1993) or a direct formative measure (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). 
That is, the construct is formed by direct linear combinations of its indicators or component 
measures. In composite variables, high correlations between specific components are not 
expected, and therefore causal indicators need not be internally consistent (Bollen & Lennox, 
1991). Hence, we believe the measurement error of the participation variable can be ignored. 
Union instrumentality for wages. Union instrumentality for wages was measured with 
three items. One came from Martin and Peterson’s (1987) study of two-tier wage systems, “The 
local association has helped us obtain fair pay.” The others were designed for this study and 
asked how satisfied the respondents were with the their local association’s role in getting 
better wages and in getting better fringe benefits for members. These items were measured on 
a scale ranging from 1 (very satisfied) to 5 (very dissatisfied), with a= .84. 
Union instrumentality for non-wage outcomes. Union instrumentality for non-wage 
outcomes was measured with a three-item scale. The scale asked members how satisfied they 
were with their local association’s role in improving job security, getting the employer to 
improve the physical work environment, and making work more intrinsically enjoyable (a=.76). 
Distributive justice (or wage equity). Distributive justice (or wage equity) was measured 
with an adaptation of Folger and Konovsky’s (1989) two-item Distributive Justice scale. Items 
for this scale were “My salary gives me the full amount I deserve,” and “The size of my salary is 
fair” (a=.86). 
Procedural justice. Procedural justice was measured with two items from Folger and 
Konovsky’s (1989) Procedural Justice Feedback scale, adapted to teacher salary schedules. 
Items were “The local association leaders tried to be fair when they negotiated the current 
salary schedule” and “During the last negotiations, the local association leaders were willing to 
consider my views regarding the salary schedule” (a=. .76). 
To test for discriminant validity, we subjected all the items of the seven latent outcome 
variables, except participation, to a seven-factor CFA at the individual level of analysis, x,2(350, 
N =4,464) =5,275.024, p<.001. The fit indices indicated an acceptable level of fit to the data (CFI 
= .93, TLI = .92, RMSEA = .056, SRMR= .056). All items loaded significantly on their latent factors. 
R2 values for the items ranged between a low of .37 and a high of .89. This seven-factor model 
was a significantly better fit to the data than was a three-factor model (union commitment, 
union instrumentality, and justice), Ax,2 (2, N =4,464) = 12,359, p < .001. 
Control Variables 
In addition to economic and demographic variables, we controlled for the union’s 
relationship with the employer. 
Economic and demographic local union characteristics. The following school district data 
were provided by the state association: financial wealth and student enrollment in the school 
district. Wealth is a composite index of district wealth based on the personal income and 
property value of citizens in the school district, compiled by the state and used by the state 
association to assess the financial soundness of school districts. 
Relations with employer (school administration). Relations with the employer (school 
administration) were measured by asking the presidents to describe the nature of the 
relationship between the local union and the school administration. Ratings were assessed with 
a nine-item union-management climate scale developed by Kosnik and Brett (1988). The scale 
covered the agreement that fundamental problems should be solved outside the collective 
bargaining contract, the degree of cooperation and trust in the union-school administration 
relationship, and the union’s involvement in school governance (a=.91). 
Union member characteristics. Salary information was provided for each member by the 
state association, and information about gender and the number of years a respondent had 
been a union member was available from the member surveys. 
Statistical Analyses: Model Descriptions 
In this study, individuals are clustered within local unions. To examine the level of non-
independence in the data, we calculated ICC1 for the outcome variables applied to the union 
members. ICC1 values were 23% for wage instrumentality, 10% for nonwage outcomes 
instrumentality, 20% for wage equity (distributive justice), and 11% for procedural justice. The 
ICC1 values for the union commitment subscales and union participation were as follows: 9.3% 
for union loyalty, 2.7% for responsibility to the union, 5.1% for willingness to work for the union, 
and 7.3% for union participation. This meant that there was sufficient between-union variance 
in members’ perceptions of union instrumentality, distributive and procedural justice, union 
loyalty, willingness to work for the union, and participation to analyze the data with hierarchical 
linear models (HLMs; Raudenbush & Byrk, 2001). Strictly speaking, the nearly 3% between-
union variance in responsibility was sufficiently significant to warrant multi-level modeling, but 
there was, of course, much less between-level variance to explain. However, we did test an 
HLM model with two levels for each of the eight outcome variables. 
For each of the outcome models, Level 1 is the individual rank-and-file member level 
that contains gender, number of years as a union member, and salary (all fixed effects).9 Level 2 
is the local union level, which contains school district size and wealth as well as un ion-
employer relations and the members’ leadership descriptions (aggregated to the local union 
level). In a separate set of models, the leadership ratings supplied by the field staff were used. 
The variables were entered in the following steps: economic and demographic controls, 
individual-level explanatory variables, and union-level explanatory variables. In the equations, 
the number of union locals are reduced somewhat from the original sample by the demands for 
complete data and a sufficiently large number of within-union respondents for reliable 
aggregation. 
We followed the procedures recommended by Mathieu and Taylor (2007) and Krull and 
McKinnon (1999, 2001) to test our multi-level mediation hypotheses with lower-level mediators 
(members’ perceptions of union instrumentality and justice). Accordingly, we first examined ICC 
values for both mediators and outcome variables (the three union commitment dimensions and 
union participation). Second, we computed multi-level regressions predicting the mediators by 
control variables as well as internal and external leadership. Third, we computed multi-level 
9
 There was no theoretical reason to expect variations in slopes across local unions for these variables. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics, Intra-Class Correlations (ICCs), and Correlation Coefficients for Explanatory and Outcome Variables 
Variable 
1. Gender3 
2. Union tenure 
3. Salary (log) 
4. District size (log) 
5. District wealth 
6. Employer-union relations 
7. Procedural justice 
8. Wage equity 
9. Union instrumentality (nw) 
10. Union instrumentality (w) 
11. Loyalty 
12. Willingness to work 
13. Responsibility 
14. Participation 
15. Internal leadership 
16. External leadership 
M 
1.33 
15.39 
4.48 
3.49 
0.54 
3.31 
3.73 
2.67 
3.20 
3.74 
3.80 
3.26 
3.95 
9.03 
3.76 
3.89 
SD 
0.47 
8.21 
0.10 
0.29 
0.28 
0.81 
0.88 
1.05 
0.77 
0.87 
0.74 
0.80 
0.60 
1.53 
0.78 
0.68 
ICC1 
.11 
.21 
.10 
.23 
.08 
.05 
.03 
.08 
.13 
ICC2 
.66 
.80 
.63 
.83 
.57 
.45 
.32 
.59 
.70 
1 
.26 
.19 
-.02 
-.04 
.00 
-.05 
-.07 
-.07 
-.10 
-.06 
.05 
.11 
.09 
-.08 
.04 
2 
.23 
— 
.69 
.00 
-.01 
-.02 
.04 
.04 
.04 
.03 
.11 
.14 
.20 
.23 
.01 
.03 
3 
.05 
.54 
— 
.24 
.38 
.05 
.09 
.20 
.05 
.16 
.09 
.07 
.10 
.16 
.02 
.13 
4 
-.04 
.10 
.43 
— 
.17 
.09 
.01 
.11 
.05 
.09 
.04 
-.12 
-.10 
-.17 
.06 
.32 
5 
-.15 
.01 
.58 
.19 
— 
.14 
.09 
.16 
.12 
.17 
.06 
-.03 
-.06 
-.02 
.07 
.10 
6 
.03 
-.05 
.08 
.05 
.16 
— 
.00 
.07 
.08 
.06 
.03 
-.02 
-.04 
-.05 
-.02 
.05 
7 
-.14 
-.07 
.05 
.02 
.21 
-.03 
— 
.35 
.43 
.63 
.55 
.30 
.17 
.13 
.52 
.09 
8 
-.14 
.03 
.40 
.25 
.33 
.22 
.40 
— 
.36 
.59 
.22 
-.01 
-.12 
-.08 
.23 
.15 
9 
-.19 
-.13 
.02 
.11 
.24 
.24 
.49 
.52 
— 
.53 
.51 
.22 
.07 
.02 
.51 
.09 
10 11 
- .18 -
.03 
.31 
.18 
.31 
.15 
.67 
.77 
.62 
— 
.52 
.21 
.05 
.03 
.47 
.16 
15 
03 
09 
09 
15 
09 
65 
42 
63 
64 
63 
46 
22 
63 
09 
12 
-.03 
.08 
-.06 
-.31 
-.07 
.02 
.33 
.11 
.26 
.24 
.62 
— 
.63 
.49 
.31 
.01 
13 
.10 
.25 
-.02 
-.29 
-.17 
-.06 
.03 
-.17 
-.13 
-.09 
.26 
.58 
— 
.34 
.19 
-.02 
14 
.01 
.11 
-.04 
-.40 
-.09 
-.11 
.04 
-.14 
-.12 
-.12 
.03 
.49 
.32 
— 
.07 
-.06 
15 
-.13 
-.03 
.01 
.12 
.12 
-.07 
.65 
.30 
.55 
.52 
.73 
.34 
.05 
.00 
— 
.16 
16 
.16 
.11 
.20 
.27 
.08 
-.03 
.22 
.26 
.19 
.27 
.26 
.03 
-.05 
-.10 
.37 
— 
Note. Correlation coefficients below the diagonal are at the individual level: i^ndividual = 4,626-3,904; rs > .03 are significant at .05; rs > .04 are significant at .01. Correlation coefficients above 
the diagonal are at the local union level: N = 247; rs > .12 are significant at .05; rs > .17 are significant at .01. nw = non-wage outcomes; w = wage outcomes. 
a
 1 = female; 2 = male. 
regressions predicting the outcome variables by using control variables and internal and 
external leadership. Fourth, we estimated the same coefficients conditional on the mediators. 
Finally, we calculated the mediating effects and corresponding standard errors of internal and 
external leadership on the outcome variables. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics, ICCs, and correlation coefficients for both individual member and 
union levels are provided in Table 1. Internal and external leadership were positively correlated 
at the union level (.37), which suggests that the two leadership variables are related but 
conceptually distinct from each other. With respect to the control variables, we note that salary 
is positively correlated with wage equity at the individual level (.20) and the union level (.40) as 
well as with members’ perceptions of union instrumentality for wage outcomes (.16 and .31, 
respectively). District size, a close correlate of local union size, was correlated with externally 
focused union leadership (.32 and .27 at the individual and union levels, respectively). Of the 
survey data, instrumentality and justice perceptions were positively intercorrelated and were 
related to union loyalty in particular. The three union commitment dimensions were also 
positively correlated. Union participation was positively correlated with union commitment, the 
strongest relationship being, naturally enough, with members’ willingness to work for the union 
(.49). 
To test the first set of hypotheses, we regressed internal and external leadership on 
union instrumentality and justice variables by using HLM. The results are shown in Table 2. For 
each outcome variable, all the control variables (the individual-level demographic variables, the 
union characteristics, and employer– union relations) were entered in Step 1 and internal 
leadership at Step 2. In a third model, we entered externally focused leadership at Step 2. 
Internally focused leadership had, as hypothesized, a significant positive coefficient (B = 
0.68, p <.001) and explained 32% of variance at the local union level in members’ perceptions 
of union instrumentality for wages after controlling for individual- and union-level control 
variables. This amounted to 7% of the total variance in the wage instrumentality variable. 
Internal leadership was also significantly related to union instrumentality for non-wage 
outcomes (B =0.51, p < .001). Adding internal leadership to the equation increased the union 
level pseduo-R2 by 48%, after controlling for individual- and union-level control variables. This is 
equivalent to around 5% of the total variance in the union instrumentality for the non-wage 
outcomes variable. These results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1a. 
Hypothesis 1b stated that internally focused leadership would be positively related to 
members’ perceptions of procedural justice. As can be seen in Table 2, the internal leadership 
coefficient is significant (B = 0.66, p < .001). Adding internal leadership to the model increased 
the union-level pseudo-R2 by 55%, which equals about 6% of the total variance in procedural 
justice, supporting the hypothesis. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b described the relationship between the union president’s 
externally focused leadership and members’ perceptions of union instrumentality and wage 
equity (distributive justice), respectively. Hypothesis 2a stated that external leadership will be 
positively related to instrumentality for both wage and non-wage outcomes. The results, shown 
Table 2 
Summary of Hierarchical Multilevel Analysis: Dependent Variables are Union Instrumentality Beliefs, Procedural Justice, 
and Wage Equity 
Variable 
Gender 
Union tenure 
Salary (log) 
District size (log) 
District wealth 
Employer–Union 
relations 
Pseudo R2 (within) 
Pseudo R2 (between) 
Ax2 (dfs = 6) 
Internal leadership 
Pseudo R2 (within) 
Pseudo R2 (between) 
Ax2 (dfs = 1) 
External leadership 
Pseudo R2 (within) 
Pseudo R2 (between) 
Ax2 (dfs = 1) 
Model 1 
Robust 
B SE 
- 0 . 2 1 * " 0.03 
—0.007* 0.003 
1.47*** 0.26 
0.12 0.11 
0.29** 0.10 
0.05 0.03 
2% 
19% 
118*** 
Instrumentality (wage) 
Model 2 
Robust 
B SE 
-0.20*** 0.03 
—0.008** 0.003 
1.64*** 0.25 
0.01 0.10 
0.16 0.10 
0.07** 0.03 
0.68*** 0.08 
2% 
51% 
q i *** 
Model 3 
Robust 
B SE 
Step 1 
-0.21*** 0.03 
—0.007* 0.003 
1.45*** 0.26 
0.00 0.11 
0.27** 0.10 
0.05 0.03 
Step 2 
0.17** 0.05 
2% 
J*'. 
i , - * * * 
Instrumentality (non-wage) 
Model 1 
Robust 
B SE 
-0.11*** 0.03 
0.009** 0.003 
—0.28 0.23 
0.09 0.08 
0.29** 0.08 
0.07** 0.02 
1% 
16% 
c^r*** 
Model 2 
Robust 
B SE 
-0.10*** 0.03 
0.008** 0.003 
—0.22 0.22 
0.01 0.07 
0.20** 0.07 
0.09*** 0.02 
0.51*** 0.05 
1% 
64% 
101*** 
Model 3 
B 
-0.11*** 
0.009** 
—0.31 
0.04 
0.28*** 
0.07** 
0.08* 
1% 
21% 
7.1** 
Robust 
SE 
0.03 
0.003 
0.23 
0.09 
0.08 
0.02 
0.03 
Table 2 
(Continued) 
Model 1 
B 
—0.11** 
0.00 
1.12*** 
—0.11 
0.17* 
—0.02 
1% 
4% 
c i * * * 
Robust 
SE 
0.03 
0.00 
0.31 
0.09 
0.08 
0.02 
Procedural justice 
Model 2 
B 
-0.10*** 
0.00 
1.17*** 
—0.19* 
0.05 
0.01 
Robust 
SE 
0.03 
0.00 
0.26 
0.08 
0.07 
0.02 
Model 3 
B 
—0.11** 
0.00 
1.09*** 
—0.19* 
0.16* 
—0.02 
Robust 
SE 
Step 
0.03 
0.00 
0.30 
0.09 
0.08 
0.02 
Model 1 
B 
1 
-0.18*** 
—0.01** 
2.11*** 
0.23 
0.23* 
0.10** 
2% 
26% 
121*** 
Robust 
SE 
0.04 
0.003 
0.30 
0.13 
0.11 
0.03 
Wage equity 
Model 2 
B 
-0.18*** 
—0.01** 
2.22*** 
0.20 
—0.14 
0.11*** 
Robust 
SE 
0.04 
0.003 
0.30 
0.12 
0.10 
0.03 
Model 3 
B 
-0.18*** 
—0.01** 
2.10*** 
0.12 
0.21* 
0.10** 
Robust 
SE 
0.04 
0.003 
0.30 
0.13 
0.10 
0.03 
Step 2 
0.66*** 
1% 
59% 
122*** 
0.05 0.44*** 
2% 
37% 
- j o*** 
0.08 
0.11** 
1% 
10% 
10** 
0.04 0.15** 
2% 
31% 
13** 
0.04 
Note. All independent variables are centered around their grand mean. All Level 1 slopes are fixed. Average Level 2 size = 15.7. Number of Level 2 
units = 248; number of Level 1 units = 3,871; t^idf) = chi-square model comparison test based on deviance statistics. 
* p < .05. " p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Table 3 
HLM Analyses of Cross-Level Mediator Effects of Instrumentality Beliefs and Justice Perceptions on the Relationship Between 
Leadership and Loyalty to the Union 
Variable 
Gender 
Union tenure 
Salary (log) 
District size (log) 
District wealth 
Employer–union relations 
Pseudo R2 (within) 
Pseudo R2 (between) 
Ax2(6) 
Internal leadership 
Pseudo R2 (within) 
Pseudo R2 (between) 
Ax2(l) 
External leadership 
Pseudo R2 (within) 
Pseudo R2 (between) 
Ax2(l) 
Union instrumentality (w) 
Union instrumentality (nw) 
Procedural justice 
Wage equity 
Pseudo R2 (within) 
Pseudo R2 (between) 
Ax2(4) 
Model 1 
B 
-0 .10*" 
0.007** 
0.21 
0.04 
0.10 
0.02 
2% 
5% 
f^Q*** 
Robust SE 
0.02 
0.002 
0.19 
0.06 
0.05 
0.02 
Loyalty to the union 
Model2 Model 3 
B 
-0.10*** 
0.006** 
0.34* 
—0.04 
—0.01 
0.04** 
0.54*** 
2% 
96% 
214*** 
RobustSE B 
Step 1 
0.02 —0.04 
0.002 0.006** 
0.16 0.05 
0.04 0.01 
0.04 —0.08* 
0.01 0.01 
Step 2 
0.03 0.19*** 
Step 3 
0.17*** 
0.23*** 
0.23*** 
-0.09*** 
43% 
81% 
1,817*** 
Robust SE 
0.02 
0.002 
0.14 
0.03 
0.04 
0.01 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
Model 4 
B 
-0.10*** 
0.008** 
0.18 
—0.01 
0.09 
0.02 
0.08** 
2% 
14% 
i < * * * 
Robust SE 
0.02 
0.002 
0.19 
0.07 
0.05 
0.02 
0.03 
Model 5 
B 
—0.05* 
0.007** 
—0.25 
0.04 
—0.05 
0.02 
0.02 
0.18*** 
0.23*** 
0.23*** 
-0.09*** 
38% 
73% 
1,977*** 
Robust SE 
0.02 
0.002 
0.15 
0.04 
0.04 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
Note. All Level 1 slopes are fixed. Average Level 2 size = 15.7. Number of Level 2 units = 248; number of Level 1 units = 3,871. 
* p < .05. " p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Table 4 
HLM Analyses of Cross-Level Mediator Effects of Instrumentality Beliefs and Justice Perceptions on the Relationships Between Leadership and Willingness, Responsibility, 
and Participation 
Variable 
Gender 
Union tenure 
Salary (log) 
District size (log) 
District wealth 
Employer-union relations 
Pseudo R2 (within) 
Pseudo R2 (between) 
Ax2(6) 
Internal leadership 
Pseudo R2 (within) 
Pseudo R2 (between) 
Ax2(l) 
Union instrumentality (w) 
Union instrumentality (nw) 
Procedural justice 
Wage equity 
Pseudo R2 (within) 
Pseudo R2 (between) 
Ax2(4) 
Model 1 
B 
0.03 
0.006** 
0.27 
-0.28*** 
-0 .05 
0.00 
2% 
26% 
92*** 
Robust 
SE 
0.02 
0.002 
0.16 
0.05 
0.04 
0.02 
Willingness to work 
Model 2 
B 
0.03 
0.006** 
0.33* 
-0.32*** 
-0.09* 
0.01 
0.26*** 
2% 
65% 
51*** 
Robust 
SE 
0.02 
0.002 
0.16 
0.04 
0.04 
0.02 
0.03 
Model 3 
B 
0.06* 
0.005** 
0.36* 
-0.28*** 
-0.13* 
0.01 
0.08* 
0.08*** 
0.11™ 
0.17™ 
-0 .12™ 
14% 
48% 
489*** 
Robust 
SE 
0.02 
0.002 
0.15 
0.04 
0.04 
0.02 
0.04 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
Responsibility 
Model 1 
B 
0.06** 
0.007** 
0.20 
-0.17*** 
-0.09** 
-0 .01 
3% 
52% 
157*** 
Robust 
SE 
0.02 
0.002 
0.14 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
to the union 
Model 2 
B 
Step 
0.06** 
0.007*** 
0.22 
-0 .18™ 
-0.10** 
-0 .01 
Step 
0.06* 
3% 
58% 
5* 
Step 
Robust 
SE 
1 
0.02 
0.002 
0.14 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
2 
0.02 
3 
Model 3 
B 
0.06*** 
0.006*** 
0.38** 
-0 .15™ 
-0 .11™ 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.03** 
0.11™ 
-0 .11™ 
10% 
47% 
273*** 
Robust 
SE 
0.02 
0.002 
0.14 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
Model 1 
B 
0.10 
0.02** 
2.16™ 
-1 .00™ 
-0 .21* 
-0.07 
5% 
38% 
241*** 
Robust 
SE 
0.05 
0.005 
0.41 
0.13 
0.10 
0.04 
Participation 
Model 2 
B 
0.10 
0.02** 
2.19*** 
-1.01*** 
-0.23* 
-0.07 
0.10 
5% 
39% 
1.2 
Robust 
SE 
0.05 
0.004 
0.41 
0.13 
0.10 
0.04 
0.09 
Model 3 
B 
0.10 
0.02** 
2.36*** 
-0.93*** 
-0.23*** 
-0.05 
-0 .01 
0.04 
0.00 
0.27*** 
-0 .21™ 
8% 
41% 
126*** 
Robust 
SE 
0.05 
0.005 
0.40 
0.13 
0.10 
0.04 
0.09 
0.05 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
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Note. All independent variables are centered around their grand mean. All Level 1 slopes are fixed. Average Level 2 size 
'p < .05. "p < .01. *"p < .001. 
15.7. Number of Level 2 units = 248; number of Level 1 units = 3871. 
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Figure 1. Illustrative model of cross-level mediation: Mediators of the 
relationship between internal leadership and loyalty to the union. ***p < .001. 
Figure 3. Illustrative model of cross-level mediation: Mediators of the 
relationship between internal leadership and responsibility to the union. 
**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Figure 2. Illustrative model of cross-level mediation: Mediators of the 
relationship between internal leadership and willingness to work for the 
union. *'"p < .001. 
Figure 4. Illustrative model of cross-level mediation: Mediators of the 
relationship between internal leadership and participation in the union. 
"*p < .001. 
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Figure 5. Illustrative model of cross-level mediation: Mediators of the 
relationship between external leadership and loyalty. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
***p < .001. 
in the Model 3 columns in Table 2, illustrate that externally focused union leadership 
contributed positively to the variance in both instrumentality for wages (B =0.17, p < .01) and 
instrumentality for non-wage outcomes (B =0.08, p < .05). The explained pseudo-R2s were 8% 
for wage instrumentality and 2% for non-wage outcomes instrumentality. These figures 
amounted to only about 2% and less than 1% of the total variance of these variables, 
respectively. Both are significant, but hardly impressive, additions. The results provide weak 
support for Hypothesis 2a. In fact, when we ran both of the leadership variables in the same 
equation, external leadership was no longer significant for either outcome variable. 
Hypothesis 2b stated that the time and effort union presidents expend on externally 
focused union activities will be positively related to members’ perceptions of wage equity. The 
results, listed in the last column in Table 2, supported the hypothesis (B = 0.15, p < .001). The 
addition of external leadership to the equation increased the union-level pseudo-R2 by 5%, 
which is a significant, but modest, increment that amounts to 1% of the total variance in the 
wage equity variable. When both leadership variables were entered in the equation, both 
external leadership (B = 0.09, p < .05) and internal leadership (B = 0.38, p <.001) were significant. 
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, which described the mediating role of instrumentality and 
justice perceptions on the leadership– union commitment and leadership–participation 
relationships, we ran a set of HLMs for each outcome variable to estimate the cross-level 
mediator effects. As was the case with the previous models, we entered individual- and union-
level control variables in the first three steps. In the fourth step, we entered the leadership 
variable and estimated its direct effect (Bd). In the last step, we entered the mediators as one 
set to estimate the direct effect of leadership after statistically accounting for the mediator 
effects (Bd’). The difference between these two coefficient estimates (Bd – Bd’) measures the 
extent to which the mediators as a set account for the relationship between leadership and the 
outcome variable in question. A full mediation is suggested when Bd is significant and Bd’is zero 
or close to zero. A partial mediation is suggested when Bd is significant and Bd’ decreases in 
value but is not close to zero (e.g., still significant). 
The mediator effect for each mediator is calculated by using the estimates of the effect 
of leadership (Ba) on the mediator (from Table 2) and the estimates of the mediator (Bb) on the 
outcome variable (from Tables 3 and 4). The product of these two estimated coefficients (BaX 
Bb) is an estimate of the cross-level mediated effect for each hypothesized mediator. The 
standard errors of these cross-level mediated effects are calculated by using the multi-level 
first-order Taylor series expansion as recommended by Krull and MacKinnon (1999). 
The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 3 and 4 and in Figures 1 through 5. 
We first describe the results from the tests of Hypothesis 3, which stated that the relationship 
between union presidents’ internally focused leadership and members’ commitment to the 
union will be partially mediated by members’ instrumentality perceptions and procedural 
justice. The results for the affective commitment dimension, union loyalty, are shown in Models 
1–3 in Table 3. The coefficient estimated for the internal leadership–loyalty relationship 
dropped from 0.54 to 0.19, with no change in its standard error (SE = 0.03), once the 
instrumentality and justice perceptions were entered in the equation. Figure 1shows the cross-
level mediated effects for all three mediators; these were significant and positive. Although 
wage equity was not part of Hypothesis 3, we examined its effects as a mediator of the internal 
leadership– union loyalty as well. It was negative. 
The mediation results for the two behavioral dimensions of union commitment and for 
union participation are shown in Table 4 and Figures 2–4. Union instrumentality perceptions 
and procedural justice also partially mediated the relationship between internal leadership and 
members’ willingness to work for their union. The coefficient estimated for the internal 
leadership– willingness to work relationship dropped from 0.26 to 0.08, with almost no change 
in its standard error (SE = 0.03 vs. 0.04,respectively), once the instrumentality and justice 
perceptions were accounted for (Table 4, first three columns). The cross-level mediator effects 
for both union instrumentality perceptions and procedural justice were significant and positive, 
but the effect was negative for wage equity (see Figure 2). 
The results of the models for the second behavioral commitment dimension, 
responsibility to the union, are listed in the middle three columns in Table 4. There was a 
significant but weak relationship between internally focused leadership and members’ 
responsibility to the union to begin with (.06), and the addition of the mediators reduced this 
coefficient to zero. The cross-level mediated effects for procedural justice and union 
instrumentality for non-wage outcomes were positive and significant, although the latter effect 
was small. The cross-level mediated effect for union instrumentality for wage outcomes was 
not significant. The mediated effect for wage equity was significant and negative (Figure 3). 
The results for union participation are listed in the last three columns in Table 4 and in 
Figure 4. The coefficient of the relationship between the presidents’ internal leadership and 
union participation changed from 0.10 to –0.01 when the mediators were accounted for, which 
suggests a possible mediation effect. However, both of these coefficients had high standard 
errors (0.09) and were therefore not significantly different from zero. The mediated effects 
were similar to the results we found for responsibility to the union except that the mediated 
effect of union instrumentality for non-wage outcomes was also not significant; altogether, the 
results of cross-level mediation provide partial support for Hypothesis 3. The hypothesis was 
supported with respect to union loyalty and willingness to work for the union, but not with 
respect to responsibility to, and participation in, the union. 
Hypothesis 4 stated that the relationship between external leadership and loyalty to the 
union will be mediated by perceptions of union instrumentality and wage equity. The results, 
listed in the last two columns in Table 3 and in Figure 5, partially supported the hypothesis. The 
coefficient for the direct relationship between external leadership and loyalty dropped from a 
significant 0.08 (p < .05) to 0.02 (ns) after accounting for the effects of the mediators. The 
mediated effects for both union instrumentality variables were positive and significant, 
whereas the mediated effect of wage equity was negative and significant (Figure 5). The 
mediated effect of procedural justice was also positive. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to discover how, and to what extent, union presidents can 
contribute to union members’ perceptions of union instrumentality, wage equity, and beliefs 
about the union’s use of fair decision making processes. Such perceptions and beliefs are initial 
steps in the formation of union commitment and participation, the usual outcome variables in 
psychological research on union membership. We focused the study on members’ experiences 
with wages and related collective bargaining outcomes because these are of central importance 
to union members and often are the main reason why members belong to a union. We 
assumed that a relationship between leadership and union involvement would come through 
the leader’s influence on instrumentality and justice perceptions. A secondary purpose was, 
therefore, to test mediation models of union commitment and participation. 
We took it as a given that part of the variance in members’ perceptions of union 
instrumentality and wage equity, union commitment, and participation would come from the 
union itself—that is, there would be differences between local unions that could explain 
members’ beliefs, attitudes, and involvement levels. We argued that a significant part of those 
differences could be attributed to local union presidents. The data supported those hypotheses. 
The results showed that there were substantial differences between local unions with 
respect to members’ beliefs about union instrumentality for wage outcomes and wage equity, 
reflecting in part the reality of the unions’ accomplishments at the bargaining table. There were 
more modest between-union differences in members’ perceptions of the union’s role in 
improving job security and working conditions and of the fairness with which wage bargaining 
goals were set. 
Both internally and externally focused leadership explained significant amounts of 
variance in members’ perceptions of union instrumentality and justice. In unions where 
members reported that their president was more engaged in making the union a viable and 
useful presence in the members’ daily work life—solving their problems, consulting with them, 
and encouraging their involvement— members saw the local as more instrumental for outcome 
attainment, and as more inclusive, than was the case in unions with presidents who were less 
active internally. The positive relationships held as well where the presidents were engaged in 
meeting the external obligations of their leadership role—working with the employer, 
preparing for negotiations, monitoring the school board, building coalitions, or planning for the 
future. The amount of between-union variance captured by internally focused leadership was 
larger than the variance explained by externally focused leadership. This is not surprising given 
the distance in time and space between the presidents’ externally focused activities and the 
members’ personal experiences with bargaining processes and outcomes. The immediacy of 
what a union leader tells the members, or demonstrates directly to them, about the union’s 
efforts, accomplishments, and future plans is likely to have a stronger effect on the members’ 
perceptions and beliefs than will the largely unobservable outside efforts the leader expends on 
the members’ behalf. However, some of the difference in effect sizes between internal and 
external leadership may be due to common method variance that will have biased the 
coefficients of internal leadership upward. The data on internal leadership and outcome 
variables came from the union members, while a different source—union staff—provided the 
information about external leadership. 
Relationships Between Union Leadership and Member Commitment and Participation 
The union-level effects on member commitment and participation were considerably 
smaller than the effects on members’ perceptions of union instrumentality and justice. It 
appears that specific beliefs about, or perceptions of, the union are more sensitive to what 
union members experience directly than are more global attitudes and behavioral intentions. 
This means that there will be less between-union variance in members’ actual involvement in 
the union to explain with leadership. Judging by the psychologically grounded studies on unions 
to date, however, it is commitment and participation that have captured researchers’ interests. 
We found significant positive relationships between the president’s internal leadership 
and member loyalty to, and willingness to work for, the union, partially mediated through 
instrumentality and procedural justice. We had not expected to see full mediation because 
internal leadership could influence union commitment for reasons we did not include in the 
study, such as by fostering more ideologically based pro-union attitudes or by increasing 
perceptions of union support (e.g., Tetrick, Shore, McClurg, & Vandenberg, 2007). As predicted, 
externally focused leadership was also positively related to union loyalty, explained fully by 
procedural justice and instrumentality perceptions. 
The effects of wage equity did not support an economic model of social exchange. We 
had predicted that instrumentality and wage equity perceptions would be positively related to 
union loyalty. As expected, union instrumentality and union loyalty were positively correlated. 
Wage equity, however, was negatively related to all the outcome variables when we controlled 
for instrumentality and procedural justice. The mediating effects of wage equity were modest 
and should therefore not be overinterpreted, but they do suggest that union members who 
believe they are paid what they deserve see less of a need for getting involved in the union. The 
union is not the sole provider of distributive justice when it comes to wages and benefits, 
however. In this study, wage equity was also a function of school district wealth that influenced 
wage levels, so part of the members’ beliefs that they were fairly paid could justifiably be 
attributed to employer munificence. Members’ beliefs that the union had helped them obtain 
fair wages contributed positively to loyalty and willingness to work for the union, so it was not 
the union’s role in ensuring wage equity that lowered affective and behavioral commitment. 
The effects of procedural justice, on the other hand, were consistent with the 
predictions from group-value theory (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Members’ beliefs that their president 
used fair procedures to set union wage goals were strongly related to all commitment 
components and to participation. 
Before we discuss the implications of our findings for union presidents, or local unions 
as institutions, it is worthwhile to examine the other factors that had an effect on union 
members’ perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. Both demographic and economic variables 
were related to the outcome variables in this study. Women were more inclined to report 
higher instrumentality and justice ratings than were men, and women reported more loyalty 
but less behavioral commitment. Union tenure was negatively related to instrumentality and 
wage equity perceptions but positively related to union commitment and participation. Wages 
had, as one would expect, positive effects on perceptions of wage equity, wage instrumentality, 
and procedural justice, as well as on behavioral commitment and union participation, but 
wages did not contribute to union loyalty. 
There is little union leaders can do about the demographic composition of the membership, of 
course, other than being aware of the effects of demography and targeting the less committed 
and involved for inclusion. 
The effects of school district size, a proxy for union size, and district wealth, an indicator 
of the employer’s ability to pay, speak to the special challenges local leaders have in larger 
unions and in unions that bargain with wealthier employers. In larger unions, members were 
likely to report less procedural justice, and less willingness to work for, show responsibility 
toward, and participate in the union. These negative effects of size on member commitment 
were augmented by district wealth. A large union local where members can be spread over 
several workplaces could certainly constrain a president’s ability to keep in contact with, service, 
and engage the members. Because it is easier for members in large unions to avoid active 
participation—it is more difficult to hide in smaller bargaining units—it suggests that internal 
leadership responsibilities should be more widely shared. 
Implications for Local Union Leadership 
Given the findings from prior research on union commitment, it was not surprising to 
see strong direct relationships between internally focused union leadership and members’ 
perceptions of union instrumentality as well as mediating effects of the latter on union 
commitment. Our results suggest that union leaders would be well advised to make sure 
members see the connection between what the union is doing to obtain favorable outcomes 
for the membership and the outcomes they experience, not only through formal collective 
bargaining but also through less noticeable activities, such as informal negotiations with the 
employer and external coalition building. Most, if not all, union leaders will recognize the 
importance of bringing a “union utility” message to the membership, but it may not be obvious 
to a union president that spending more time directly engaged with the rank-and-file would be 
time well spent. 
We suggest that the effective management of the union’s internal state, or “health,” 
goes beyond the service orientation identified in the shop stewards studies (Metochi, 2002; 
Nicholson et al., 1980) to include the creation and maintenance of an organization that is a 
constant presence or force in the members’ work lives. In other words, an effective local 
president should make sure members are aware of the union and what it is doing for them all 
the time, not only during grievance hearings and contract negotiations. 
The same argument holds with respect to procedural justice. The positive relationships 
between the members’ beliefs that their leaders used fair processes and union commitment 
and participation testify to the importance of including members in union decision making. 
Giving members a voice in relevant decisions by consulting with them, and listening to them, is 
not the same as getting them actively involved in working for the union—the ultimate goal of 
increasing union commitment—but it appears to be a step on the way toward having a more 
active membership. 
Although the relationships between external leadership and members’ beliefs and 
attitudes were modest, it does not mean that union presidents, or other union officers, can 
ignore the external component of their jobs. We can say less about the possible effects of 
external leadership on union members on the basis of our data, but that in no way diminishes 
the importance of external leadership to the union and its members. 
Our leadership measures were based on an analysis of the union president’s role and 
were intended to capture different leader activities both within and outside the local. However, 
neither the members nor the field staff ratings provided a clearly articulated picture of different 
dimensions of either internal or external leadership. Scale items were highly intercorrelated— 
the president who was perceived as active in one area was also seen as active in the other areas. 
Internal and external leadership were also positively correlated, which suggests that the 
president who worked to make the union an active and useful presence in the members’ work 
life was also actively engaged in tending to the union’s business on the outside. The fact that 
there was agreement about the general activity level of the presidents from independent 
observers who rated leader behavior from different vantage points suggests there may be an 
overall “union leader engagement” effect that includes most facets of the union president’s job, 
certainly all the ones we measured. 
This was a study of union presidents. A local union president, or any other chief officer, 
is not alone in running the union. In some locals, the senior officer may not have much of a staff 
or hard working individuals in other leadership roles, but there will nevertheless be additional 
actors in union positions. We justified our research focus by arguing that a significant part of a 
union effect on members’ beliefs and attitudes would be due to the president. The focus on the 
senior, or central, officer very likely underestimated the effects of total union leadership. A 
more complete study of union leadership effects might include a larger set of actors and an 
expanded model of the areas they serve. It would also be useful to have a broader analysis of 
different union leaders’ engagement in, and effects of, both servicing and internal organizing 
activities than we were able to provide in this study. 
By testing hypotheses about the psychological processes that explained the relationship 
between union leaders’ behavior and members’ attitudes toward, and involvement in, their 
union, we narrowed the study of the union president’s role to the influence component of 
leadership. Occupying a leadership position in any organization requires more than exerting 
influence, however. As general leadership theory makes clear (e.g., Yukl, 2002), the road to 
leadership effectiveness includes administrative and managerial tasks as well. A more complete 
study of local union leadership, or even of union presidents, would go beyond our definitions of 
internal and external leadership to include an examination of how the leader manages, or 
administers, the local, including the development and maintenance of an effective leadership 
structure. 
Methodological Concerns in Studies on Unions 
This was a cross-sectional study, and if it had included only data on leadership and union 
members’ perceptions and attitudes, we could make an argument about a reverse attribution, 
in which presidents of effective local unions get the credit for the union’s success at the 
bargaining table and descriptions of leader behavior reflect a positive halo. The only way to 
dispose of such an alternative hypothesis in cross-sectional research is through the use of 
control variables. 
The demographic and economic controls used in this study have important implications 
for psychological research on union membership and leadership. Gender, education, and union 
tenure are the usual controls in studies on union commitment and participation.10 Based on 
our results, we recommend that wages be added to the list of standard controls in research on 
antecedents of union commitment because they are likely to create a halo effect (negative or 
positive), influencing ratings of leader behaviors or characteristics that are unrelated to wage 
bargaining. 
It was also important to control for school district wealth and size. Both had direct 
effects on bargaining outcomes and on member perceptions, which suggests that a search for 
10 
In this study, education was highly correlated with salary because the latter was determined by a Seniority X Education grid. We therefore 
excluded education from the statistical models. 
pure union effects on members’ attitudes and behaviors will be biased upward unless we 
control for exogenous causes of union success. 
We recommend expanding research beyond single organizations. The benefit of a study 
with multiple data sources and a large sample of local unions is that it makes it possible to 
move beyond well-known and often-examined union attitude models to look at the effects of 
union characteristics. 
Finally, we want to note that it is also important to consider contextual variables at 
levels above local unions and employers because these might influence the nature of the 
relationships between leadership and member perceptions and attitudes. For example, in 
states or cities with high union density, or with tight labor markets, union leaders’ use of 
external networks and coalition building to secure wages and benefits for the members may be 
more effective than it might be in areas where unions are less powerful and more constrained 
politically. This, in turn, could mean that the relationship between a union official’s external 
leadership efforts and members’ perceptions of union instrumentality, wage equity, and 
commitment would be stronger in some contextual circumstances than in others. 
Limitations and Conclusion 
We focused the analysis of possible leadership effects on a set of instrumentality and 
justice perceptions related to collective bargaining outcomes—wages, fringe benefits, job 
security, the work environment, and job content. This decision was driven by the importance of 
wage bargaining to the union and its members— the “bread and butter” of union 
membership—but it meant that we excluded other factors that could have been significant in 
the models of union commitment and participation, such as pro-union attitudes. Our primary 
interests were the relationships between leadership and instrumentality and justice 
perceptions, not commitment and participation, but it would have been a more complete study 
of the latter two had we used an expanded model. 
The usual concerns about single-source variance apply to the data from the union 
members. The relationships between union leadership and member perceptions could contain 
common method variance. On the other hand, the individual-level correlations between scale 
scores ranged from .00, where there were no reasons to expect relationships, to a high of .63, 
where there were very good reasons to expect high positive correlations (for example, between 
responsibility toward, and willingness to work for, the union), which tends to mitigate the 
concern somewhat. Having leadership data from two independent sources that produced 
similar results also strengthens our findings. 
A common problem for all studies that use leader behavior scales is the influence of 
implicit leadership theories on ratings (Lord, 1985; Lord & Maher, 1991). There are no scale 
construction procedures that will eliminate them, but there are steps one can take to 
encourage the raters’ use of episodic memory (remembering) instead of semantic memory 
(knowing; see Martell & Evans, 2005). One can ground measurement in specific events in 
specific contexts that are less influenced by the raters’ general knowledge about leadership or 
leader traits and prototypes (Gioia & Sims, 1985; Uleman, 1991). We designed our scale items 
to be specific to the local unions in this study and to cover leader behaviors that were related to 
union activities and member’s concerns, such as talking to members about contract proposals, 
contract negotiations, and members’ rights under the contract; talking to members about 
becoming active in the local union; or helping members solve conflicts with school 
administration. Some of the scale items were more general, however, such as counseling 
members about work related problems, and therefore more likely to access semantic memory. 
With respect to scale items triggering vivid memory as opposed to a general feeling (Martell & 
Evans, 2005), we believe that the union context is sufficiently different from the teachers’ 
regular work context—they are exposed to the union context less regularly than to their 
classrooms and school buildings and may therefore have had a better recall of what they 
actually experienced or observed instead of a more general impression of internal leadership. 
We cannot argue that our measure is free from implicit theory bias, however; we can argue 
only that we did our best to minimize it. 
The third question one can raise is whether our results can be generalized beyond 
teachers’ unions or associations. This study was about relationships between variables, not 
magnitudes. There is no obvious theoretical reason why public school teachers should respond 
differently to union instrumentality and justice than do members of other unions. There is also 
some empirical evidence that demonstrates the similarity of responses to union commitment 
scales between members of teachers’ associations and mail carriers’ unions (Bayazit et al., 
2004). The external role of the president of a teachers’ union local is to some extent shaped by 
the special political constraints on, and opportunities provided by, the public funding for 
education and by the nature of the teaching profession, but local union leaders will always have 
to respond to their specific environments regardless of their members’ occupations and 
industry. The common denominator for all unions is the effort to improve the conditions of 
employment for the membership. 
We think this study demonstrates the value of including union-specific institutional 
knowledge in research on union commitment and participation. Knowing what was of particular 
importance to the state and national association shaped our models with respect to the 
definition of union leadership and the emphasis placed on wage bargaining and justice. Both 
proved important as explanatory and outcome variables. We believe that conceptual and 
empirical work on the psychology of leadership, attitudes, and involvement in unions would 
benefit from increased knowledge about unions as institutions as well as increased knowledge 
of industrial relations theory. 
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Appendix 
Union Presidents Leadership Scales: Internally Focused Leadership 
In this scale, respondents (union members) were asked to state how often their local 
association president does the following: 
Consulting and Encouraging Participation 
1. Involves members in the decision making process. 
2. Encourages members to become active in the association. 
3. Asks members what they would like to see in the local’s contract proposals. 
4. Solicits information from members about their needs and concerns. 
Informing 
5. Informs members about their rights under the contract. 
6. Talks to members about the contract and about negotiations. 
7. Keeps members informed about the local Association. 
8. Makes sure members are educated about the local Association/SEA/NEA.* 
Problem Solving 
9. Helps members solve conflicts with school administrators. 
10. Counsels members about work related problems. 
11. Helps to solve conflicts between members or different groups 
of members. 
12. Is there for me when I need him/her. 
* SEA =State Education Association; NEA =National EducationAssociation 
